Written by Moot Court Committee KRMU

The case of Courts on Its Own Motion in Re: Suicide Committed by Sushant Rohilla marks a turning point in how Indian courts view student welfare, legal education, and institutional accountability. A brief timeline of the key developments is as follows:

• 10 August 2016 – Law student Sushant Rohilla, enrolled at Amity Law School, Delhi (affiliated to GGSIPU), tragically died by suicide.
• August–September 2016 – Friends and classmates circulated messages alleging that he was mentally distressed due to academic pressure and debarment from examinations because of attendance shortage.
• Late 2016 – A detailed letter-petition was written to the Chief Justice of India, explaining the circumstances of his death and alleging institutional apathy.
• Early 2017 – The Supreme Court treated the letter as a writ petition under Article 32, and later transferred the matter to the Delhi High Court, where it was registered as W.P. (CRL) 793/2017.
• 2017–2024 – The Delhi Police Crime Branch investigated the matter under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide).
• 03 October 2024 – The Magistrate accepted the closure report, finding no evidence of instigation, conspiracy, or criminal intent by faculty.
• Post-closure – A protest petition by the family was treated as a private complaint, while the institution and the family later reached a settlement, and individual faculty were removed from proceedings.
• Following settlement – The High Court continued the case to address systemic issues: mental health in universities, student grievance mechanisms, and punitive attendance norms.

The police investigation under Section 306 IPC concluded that no instigation, conspiracy, or mens rea could be attributed to any faculty members. Attendance shortage had affected several students, and no academic record suggested targeted harassment. The Magistrate accepted the closure report, bringing the criminal aspect to an end. Yet, the High Court refused to treat the matter as closed. It recognized that while the law could not punish a particular person, the law could reform a system that had become rigid, insensitive, and hostile to student mental health. In this way, the case transitioned from an individual grievance into a public intervention.

The Court discussed how educational institutions are not mere examination factories. Students spend their formative years within these walls, wrestling with stress, ambition, grief, financial anxieties, and personal vulnerabilities. When such institutions apply bureaucratic rules without compassion, they convert academic policy into psychological pressure. The tragedy of Sushant was, therefore, not an isolated incident but a visible symptom of a deeper structural flaw the absence of institutional empathy.

One of the key failures the Court identified was the lack of meaningful grievance mechanisms. Students who face difficulties must not be expected to rely on personal relationships with professors or silent endurance. Universities require structured channels through which students may speak, complain, and be heard. This cannot be a token committee buried in a website footer. It must be accessible, student- inclusive, confidential, and psychologically sensitive. In examining various universities, the Court found inconsistent practices: some institutions had detailed grievance frameworks, but many had committees only on paper, without counsellors or clear procedures. This silence, the Court observed, is the first stage of institutional violence.

At the heart of the case was the question of attendance a deeply misunderstood metric of learning. In law, knowledge is not confined to lecture halls. Students attend court hearings, participate in moot courts, volunteer in legal aid clinics, conduct research, and intern with advocates or law firms. These activities build skills, discipline, and professional maturity. Yet, most institutions discount them entirely, assuming the classroom to be the sole legitimate space of learning. The Court stressed that this assumption betrays the nature of legal pedagogy.

To illustrate the problem, the Court highlighted that educational systems have evolved dramatically, particularly after the pandemic:

• Learning is not restricted to physical presence.

• Hybrid and digital classrooms are widely recognized.

• Project-based and experiential learning are integral to professional degrees.

• Students may temporarily struggle with health, finances, or family responsibilities.

Despite these realities, institutions continue to punish students mechanically. Debarring them from examinations becomes a form of academic violence. The Court noted that this approach violates the principle of proportionality: even if attendance is necessary, its breach should not lead to disproportionate consequences that destroy academic futures or mental stability.

It was in this context that the Court examined the Bar Council of India’s Rules of Legal Education, 2008, especially Rule 12 of Schedule III, which requires:

• 70% minimum attendance in each subject, and

• 75% attendance overall as a pre-condition to appear in examinations.

The Court did not dispute the authority of the BCI as a professional regulator. However, it expressed strong reservations about the rigidity and outdated nature of the rule. Legal education is not like chemistry or history; it is a discipline of judgment, negotiation, public duty, and professional exposure. The Court observed that the BCI model treats legal learning as passive classroom absorption, ignoring internships, pro bono work, research, and participation in tribunals or legal clinics. In doing so, the rule distorts the very idea of what legal training should produce.

The Court urged the BCI to modernise. It called for a framework that recognises experiential activities, distinguishes between genuine hardship and absence, and avoids punitive exclusion as the default consequence. It also directed that institutions should not impose stricter norms than those set by the BCI and that no student should be automatically barred from examinations solely on attendance grounds.

THE JUDGMENT ESTABLISHED TWO MAJOR REFORMS:

1. Mandatory Grievance Redressal Committees (GRCs) in all higher education institutions.
   1. These committees must include student representatives, clear complaint procedures, mental health support, and confidentiality.
   1. The Court actively monitored compliance, requiring universities to show proof of functioning committees, trained counsellors, and accessible reporting systems.
2. Re-examination of mandatory attendance norms.
   1. Law students often balance internships, research, moot court, fieldwork, or employment. The Court questioned the rigid “75% attendance = punishment” model.
   1. It directed the Ministry of Education, UGC, and Bar Council of India to rethink attendance:
      1. Should attendance be mandatory at all?
      1. Can internships and clinical learning count as academic work?
      1. Are penalties like debarment harmful to mental health?
      1. Should professional courses be treated differently from purely theoretical ones?
      1. Can attendance be encouraged through incentives, not fear?

The Court emphasized that education must be responsive, empathetic, and aligned with modern realities hybrid learning, internships, digital platforms, and practical exposure.

The conclusion of the judgment was deeply reflective. The Court acknowledged that while no individual caused Sushant’s death, the system had failed him. Education, it held, cannot be a machinery that punishes weakness. It must be an ecosystem that listens, guides, and protects. The Court hoped that the reforms initiated through what it termed the “Sushant Rohilla Intervention” would ensure that the loss of one student becomes the protection of many.