The long-standing debate over who should appoint judges in India has resurfaced once again, this time with the Chief Justice of India (CJI), Surya Kant indicating that the Supreme Court is willing to consider a plea seeking the revival of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). This comes at a moment when questions about transparency, public accountability, and the balance of power between the judiciary and government remain central to public discourse.
The plea, filed by advocate Mathews J. Nedumpara, argues that the striking down of the NJAC in 2015 was a “great wrong” because it substituted the will of Parliament—and thereby the people—with the preferences of judges themselves. According to the petitioner, restoring the NJAC is not merely a legal correction but a democratic necessity. The very fact that the Chief Justice orally agreed to consider the plea signals that the judiciary may be open to revisiting one of the most contentious constitutional debates of the last decade.
The NJAC, introduced through the 99th Constitutional Amendment in 2014, attempted to create a more participatory mechanism by giving the government and civil society representatives an equal voice in the appointment of judges to constitutional courts. However, in 2015, a Constitution Bench struck it down as unconstitutional, reviving the Collegium system. The judgment described the NJAC as a threat to judicial independence, a foundational principle of the Indian Constitution.
Since then, the Collegium system has faced persistent criticism—lack of transparency, accusations of nepotism, and the absence of clear criteria or structured procedures. Even within the judiciary, several former judges have expressed concern that the process often appears closed, opaque, and resistant to reform. The petitioner’s argument echoes these sentiments, claiming that the collegium has become “a synonym for nepotism and favouritism.”
On the other hand, defenders of judicial independence fear that giving the government a decisive role in judicial appointments could compromise the ability of courts to check executive overreach. The NJAC judgment emphasized that the judiciary must remain insulated from political pressure, even if that means the appointment process remains entirely in judicial hands.
This renewed plea brings the conversation back to a larger question: how should India balance judicial independence with democratic accountability? Parliament unanimously supported the NJAC, reflecting a rare political consensus that the system needed change. Yet the Supreme Court’s decision preserved the collegium, reinforcing the judiciary’s primacy in safeguarding its own independence.
Almost a decade later, the concerns remain the same—but the political and judicial climate has evolved. As the Supreme Court considers whether to revisit the NJAC issue, the outcome could shape not just how judges are appointed, but how the relationship between the judiciary, Parliament, and the executive is defined for years to come.
Whether the plea leads to a substantive hearing or a fresh debate inside and outside the courtroom, it has reopened a vital conversation: Who should appoint the guardians of the Constitution, and how can India ensure both independence and accountability in that process?
